Skip to content. | Skip to navigation

Sections
 

Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments

Electoral Accountability and Corruption: Evidence from the Audits of Local Governments
by FRAME Administrator last modified Dec 21, 2016 11:52 AM
Contributors: Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan

The authors examined whether mayors with re-election incentives (i.e., those not about to complete their term limits) were less corrupt than those without such incentives.

Author(s): Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan

Download File from Portal: Ferraz Finan 2011 reelection prospects reduce corruption.pdf — PDF document, 3867 kB (3960747 bytes)

Add annotation

No annotations for this item

Page Information

Page Views: 102900

Attachments Downloaded: 39

Date Created: Friday, April 3, 2015 7:18 PM

Date Modified: Monday, April 20, 2015 2:21 PM

Filed under: , ,
Controlled Vocabulary: , , , , ,
Search

Search in the Governance area:

FRAME Communities
Group Email

Email members of the Group.

Not logged in

 
Back to Top